Cal Professor Says Coaches Should Kick Themselves
By Corey Lyons
Contra Costa Newspapers
Aug. 20, 2002
BERKELEY -- At a campus known for its esteemed professors and intellectual jousting matches, David Romer poses a question sure to fetch a double-take at any faculty cocktail party.
It's fourth down: Go for it or kick?
The economics professor recently finished a three-year study of the NFL in which he analyzed thousands of plays that agonize coaches.
His paper, "It's Fourth Down and What Does the Bellman Equation Say?," offers a cerebral-minded spin to a game often dismissed as simplicity squeezed into pads and helmets.
In a swift kick to conventional football wisdom, Romer concludes NFL teams could benefit by ditching the conservative nature of fourth-down plays.
"The results are striking," Romer, 44, said. "The analysis implies that teams should be more aggressive ... In practice, however, teams almost always kick on fourth down early in the game."
Romer reviewed nearly 20,000 first-quarter plays in 732 regular-season games between 1998-2000.
He narrowed his interest to the first quarter, presumably when neither team had a significant advantage over the other that could influence play-calling.
He used an economic concept called the "Bellman equation," which helped explain the consequences of trying for a first down, field goal or touchdown.
In the end, Romer was able to calculate the average value in points for decisions made at several specific positions on the field.
For instance, a team inside its own 50-yard line has a better chance at going for it on fourth down and 4 yards or less.
But in 1,100 fourth-downs scenarios that Romer felt teams should have gone for it, coaches opted to kick the ball away 90 percent of the time.
He's not quite sure why coaches are so conservative in calling their plays.
"I don't know. Maybe they hadn't thought of it," he said. "When you hire a football coach, maybe analyzing plays is not as important as being able to motivate players or lead a team."
Romer, who joined the economics department in 1988, has been a football fan since he grew up in Massachusetts. The idea for the project kicked off a few years ago while the professor sat in his Honda Accord, listening to a Raiders game over the radio.
"It was fourth-and-goal, and they kicked a field goal," he said. "Whoever called the game said it was the right thing to do, to take the sure points.
"So I started thinking. It wasn't obvious to me that it was the right thing to do."
In any case, he wants to see his paper published in a major economic journal. But he's not holding his breath NFL coaches will review his report and start re-thinking their decisions on the field.
"I tend to do well in persuading reporters," Romer said. "But when they call coaches, they generally dismiss it."
Contra Costa Newspapers
Aug. 20, 2002
BERKELEY -- At a campus known for its esteemed professors and intellectual jousting matches, David Romer poses a question sure to fetch a double-take at any faculty cocktail party.
It's fourth down: Go for it or kick?
The economics professor recently finished a three-year study of the NFL in which he analyzed thousands of plays that agonize coaches.
His paper, "It's Fourth Down and What Does the Bellman Equation Say?," offers a cerebral-minded spin to a game often dismissed as simplicity squeezed into pads and helmets.
In a swift kick to conventional football wisdom, Romer concludes NFL teams could benefit by ditching the conservative nature of fourth-down plays.
"The results are striking," Romer, 44, said. "The analysis implies that teams should be more aggressive ... In practice, however, teams almost always kick on fourth down early in the game."
Romer reviewed nearly 20,000 first-quarter plays in 732 regular-season games between 1998-2000.
He narrowed his interest to the first quarter, presumably when neither team had a significant advantage over the other that could influence play-calling.
He used an economic concept called the "Bellman equation," which helped explain the consequences of trying for a first down, field goal or touchdown.
In the end, Romer was able to calculate the average value in points for decisions made at several specific positions on the field.
For instance, a team inside its own 50-yard line has a better chance at going for it on fourth down and 4 yards or less.
But in 1,100 fourth-downs scenarios that Romer felt teams should have gone for it, coaches opted to kick the ball away 90 percent of the time.
He's not quite sure why coaches are so conservative in calling their plays.
"I don't know. Maybe they hadn't thought of it," he said. "When you hire a football coach, maybe analyzing plays is not as important as being able to motivate players or lead a team."
Romer, who joined the economics department in 1988, has been a football fan since he grew up in Massachusetts. The idea for the project kicked off a few years ago while the professor sat in his Honda Accord, listening to a Raiders game over the radio.
"It was fourth-and-goal, and they kicked a field goal," he said. "Whoever called the game said it was the right thing to do, to take the sure points.
"So I started thinking. It wasn't obvious to me that it was the right thing to do."
In any case, he wants to see his paper published in a major economic journal. But he's not holding his breath NFL coaches will review his report and start re-thinking their decisions on the field.
"I tend to do well in persuading reporters," Romer said. "But when they call coaches, they generally dismiss it."
posted by Corey at 1:13 PM
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